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RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN 
SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR 
REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
The state requests review of the Idaho Court of Appeals' January 17, 2014 
opinion in which the Court of Appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part the 
restitution order entered against Kristi Hurles. State v. Hurles, Docket No. 
39219, 2014 Opinion No. 3 (Idaho App., January 17, 2014) (hereinafter 
"Opinion"). Review of the Court of Appeals' Opinion is appropriate because it 
presents an issue not heretofore addressed by this Court regarding (1) the 
proper application of the principle stated in Zichko, that. .. ; and (,:,..,_~~~~t --::::::-::::::-::::~-
1· Fil[D .. COPY 
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For the Court's convenience, a copy of the Court of Appeals' opinion is attached 
hereto as Appendix A 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings In District Court 
Hurles worked at the Crescent "No Lawyers" Bar and Grill ("Crescent"). 
(PSI, p.2. 1) Following an investigation into why the Crescent was losing money 
in its lottery account, it was discovered that the "payouts" while Hurles was 
working were above average. (PSI, pp.2-3.) A separate investigation into profit 
loss for ATM use also implicated Hurles. (PSI, p.3.) When contacted by a 
detective with the Boise Police Department, Hurles initially denied taking any 
money, but later admitted doing so "because her husband had lost his job. "2 
(PSI, pp.3-4.) 
The state charged Hurles with two counts of grand theft. (R, pp.28-29.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Hurles pied guilty to one count and the state 
agreed to dismiss the other count and recommend a unified 14-year sentence 
with two years fixed. (2/17/2011 Tr., p.1, L.13 - p.2, L.17 (terms of plea 
agreement), pp.4-8 (entry of plea).) The terms of the agreement also provided 
that the state would request "restitution on all DRs that were disclosed in 
discovery" and the dismissed charge. (2/17/2011 Tr., p.1, Ls.21-22, p.8, Ls.15-
17.) 
1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file 
"HurlesPSl.pdf." 
2 Hurles' admission was limited to the ATM-related thefts; she "adamantly denied 
ever taking any money from the lottery." (PSI, p.4.) 
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Because Hurles disputed the amount of restitution owed to Butch and 
Jody Morrison, the owners of the Crescent, the court conducted two restitution 
hearings. (2/17/2011 Tr., pp.15-19; see generally 5/19/2011 Tr. and 8/4/2011 
Tr.) On cross-examination at the initial restitution hearing, defense counsel 
asked Jody if her accountant was James Warr. (5/19/2011 Tr., p.62, Ls.24-25.) 
Jody testified that Mr. Warr was no longer their accountant, but was at one time. 
(5/19/2011 Tr., p.63, Ls.1-4.) Counsel then attempted to hand Jody some 
documents that he apparently obtained from Mr. Warr and asked Jody whether 
she or her husband ever "borrowed" money from the ATM. (5/19/2011 Tr., p.63, 
Ls.11-18, p.67, L.16 - p.68, L.7; see also p.77, Ls.20-23).) Jody denied that she 
or her husband ever did so and testified that, at one point, she actually funded 
the ATM "to the tune of $4,000" using her own money. (5/19/2011 Tr., p.67, L.18 
- p.68, L.12.) Counsel also asked Jody: "Didn't your accountant actually 
confront you with the checks signed and endorsed by Butch, and you denied it 
for five months?" (5/19/2011 Tr., p.69, Ls.22-25.) Jody denied this was true. 
(5/19/2011 Tr., p.69, L.25.) Jody also explained that she had reports from her 
"then-accountant," Mr. Warr, showing an "imbalance in the credits and the debits 
of the ATM of checks written to the ATM." (5/19/2011 Tr., p. 72, Ls.2-5.) 
Defense counsel also inquired into the existence of any "record of cash 
sales during this time period." (5/19/2011 Tr., p.19-20.) Jody answered: "I have 
records of them. I have -- we have daily cash recordings that we do every day. 
We have a monthly spreadsheet that is provided to my accountant." (5/19/2011 
Tr., p.77, L.23 - p.78, L.1.) Defense counsel then advised the court it was "going 
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to hear from the accountant" that "we just don't have the records to establish" the 
claimed loss. (5/19/2011 Tr., p.79, Ls.20-25.) Defense counsel further indicated 
he had met with the accountant who was "prepared to testify." (5/19/2011 Tr., 
p.80, Ls.16-19.) Due to time constraints, the court continued the restitution 
hearing. (5/19/2011 Tr., p.80, Ls.1-12.) 
At the second hearing, Hurles called Mr. Warr as a witness. Following 
limited testimony by Mr. Warr regarding the nature of his relationship with the 
Morrisons and Crescent, the Morrisons asserted their accountant-client privilege. 
(8//4/2011 Tr., p.10, L.19- p.12, L.12.) Hurles responded that the privilege was 
waived because the Morrisons had filed a lawsuit against Mr. Warr, which 
allowed him to "now defend himself." (8/4/2011 Tr., p.12, Ls.16-18.) The court 
agreed there was a privilege but found the exception proffered by Hurles did not 
apply in the context of the restitution matter. (8/4/2011 Tr., p.13, L.21 - p.14, 
L.24.) Defense counsel responded that, in the event Mr. Warr could not testify, 
he would like additional time to find another accountant "to review this 
information." (8/4/2011 Tr., p.14, L.25 - p.15, L.5, p.16, Ls.2-5.) Although the 
court granted the request for additional time to consult an accountant, defense 
counsel complained: "even hiring a CPA is not going to be able to get us the 
admissions made by the alleged victims in this case, which is really what we 
needed from Mr. Warr anyway." (8/4/2011 Tr., p.17, Ls.22-23, p.22, Ls.7-10.) 
Nevertheless, Hurles asked for and received an additional week. (8/4/2011 Tr., 
p.22, Ls.10-12, p.24, Ls.15-19.) 
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At the final hearing, Hurles did not have a witness or additional evidence 
regarding restitution but instead revisited the issue of whether the accountant-
client privilege had been waived. (8/11/2011 Tr., p.95, L.13 p.96, L.10.) 
Defense counsel argued that, although he had not had the opportunity to review 
the original restitution hearing, his recollection was that Jody testified "in either 
direct or on cross examination, about conversations she had with her accountant" 
and contended that by doing so she waived the privilege such that Hurles should 
be allowed to call Mr. Warr to impeach Jody. (8/11/2011 Tr., p.95, Ls.18-21, 
p.96, Ls.5-16.) Defense counsel also asserted he asked Jody "questions about 
transactions that took place after Ms. Hurles was released from the Crescent" 
and explained "[t]hat's a pretty significant portion of what [he] wanted the 
accountant" to testify about. (8/11/2011 Tr., p.96, L.22 - p.97, L.7.) The court 
responded: 
Okay. This is what we are going to do. I'm going to go 
ahead and sentence her today. I'm going to order the restitution 
that's been proved to me at this point. I will give you 30 days in 
which to come in and move for reconsideration if you think that's 
inappropriate and try - and to prove to me that the . . . 
accountant/client relationship has been breached and that you are 
entitled, then, to bring the accountant in. 
You're going to have to do some research on that. And 
you're going to have to go back and listen to the original - the first 
restitution hearing in which the victim testified. And so we need to 
specifically know what it is that she said in relationship to her 
accountant to determine whether or not there was waiver. 
So it may require that you get a transcript of at least that part 
of the conversation. You wouldn't have to get one of the entire --
her entire testimony, but that part of it. So you may have to do that 
in your motion -- if you want to file a motion to reconsider. 
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Looks to me like the only thing that - that stands between 
the restitution figure being requested and the client paying that 
amount is potentially whether or not the - you can impeach the 
victim through the accountant. 
(8/11/2011 Tr., p.97, L.23 - p.99, L.1.) 
Defense counsel agreed to the court's proposed course of action and 
agreed with the court's statement that the "only thing" standing "between the 
restitution figure being requested and [Hurles] paying that amount" was whether 
Jody could be impeached by the accountant. 3 (8/11/2011 Tr., p.98, L.8, p.99, 
Ls.2-4.) The court thereafter ordered restitution in the amount of $204,174.61, 
and Hurles never followed-up on the court's invitation to establish that Jody 
Morrison waived the accountant-client privilege. (8/11/2011 Tr., p.103, Ls.11-12; 
R., pp.71-72; see R., pp.3-4 (ROA reflecting no motion to reconsider ever filed).) 
In addition to its restitution order, the court also entered judgment, 
imposing a unified 14-year sentence with two years fixed. (R., pp.67-69.) Hurles 
filed a timely notice of appeal. (R, pp.73-75.) 
Course Of Proceedings On Appeal 
On appeal, Hurles raised three issues: (1) whether the district court erred 
in concluding the Morrisons did not implicitly waive the accountant-client 
privilege; (2) whether the court's restitution award was supported by substantial 
3 When asked how he "gain[ed] knowledge that the accountant may have 
information that would be impeaching," defense counsel indicated he talked to 
Mr. Warr because he was originally subpoenaed by the state but defense 
counsel declined to provide any additional information regarding the nature of his 
discussion with Mr. Warr. (8/11/2011 Tr., p.99, Ls.5-25; see also 8/4/2011 Tr., 
p.15, Ls.22-24 (defense counsel stated at the prior hearing: "I don't want to do 
anything to hurt Mr. Warr or myself. I don't want to disclose anything.") 
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competent evidence; and (3) whether the court abused its discretion by including 
civil attorneys' fees in its restitution award.4 (Appellant's Brief, p 9.) 
With respect to the privilege issue, Hurles argued the privilege was waived 
when (1) the Morrisons "relied on Mr. Warr's documents to establish the amount 
of restitution"; (2) Judy Morrison "deci[ded) to testify as to the contents of her 
conversations with Mr. Warr"; and (3) "when the prosecutor consented to allow 
defense counsel to discuss the amount of restitution with Mr. Warr." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.10.) Hurles also argued Mr. Warr's "testimony is necessary because it is 
the only means by which the district court and Ms. Hurles could get an accurate 
restitution estimate" and it is "necessary to impeach Ms. Morrison." (Appellant's 
Brief, pp.19-20.) 
In response, the state first asserted that the Court should not consider 
Hurles' arguments regarding waiver because despite the opportunity to establish 
that Jody Morrison waived the accountant-client privilege, Hurles never followed-
up on the court's invitation to do so. Thus, Hurles never afforded the district 
court the opportunity to make an informed ruling on whether the privilege had 
been waived. See State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 378, 384, 987 P.2d 290, 296 
(1999) (quoting State v. Fisher, 123 Idaho 481, 485, 849 P.2d 942, 946 (1993)) 
(appellate court "will not 'review a trial court's alleged error on appeal unless the 
record discloses an adverse ruling which forms the basis for an assignment of 
error'"). 
4 The state is not seeking review of the Court of Appeals' resolution of this third 
issue; therefore, the merits of that claim will not be addressed in this brief. 
Should this Court grant review, the state relies on its prior brief for argument on 
this issue. (Brief of Respondent, pp.26-32.) 
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The Court of Appeals rejected the state's preservation argument, stating: 
The court's application of the privilege and exclusion of the 
accountant creates the adverse ruling that Hurles can appeal from. 
Cf. State v. lwakiri, 106 Idaho 618,621,682 P.2d 571, 574 (1984) 
(reviewing, on appeal, the trial court's ruling that the attorney-client 
privilege was waived, which allowed the attorney to testify at trial). 
The fact that Hurles' defense attorney did not file a motion to 
reconsider, as suggested by the trial court, does not translate to 
abandonment of the privilege waiver claim. The State's argument 
to the contrary cites no legal authority for its position that Hurles 
was required to move the district court to reconsider its decision to 
exclude the accountant in order to preserve the issue for appeal. 
Without legal authority, the State has waived the argument, and we 
need not consider it. Idaho Appellate Rule 35; State v. Zichko, 129 
Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996). 
(Opinion, pp.7-8.) 
In addition to the preservation issue, the state also addressed Hurles' 
specific arguments relating to waiver. (Brief of Respondent, pp.9-16.) The Court 
of Appeals ultimately determined: 
Considering that the accountant's information recited to the police 
directly dealt with the embezzlement losses, we must reverse the 
restitution order as to the award of restitution for embezzlement 
losses and remand to the district court so that Hurles may pursue 
the accountant's testimony. On remand, the district court may have 
to address the applicability of the accountant-client privilege to 
other testimony by the accountant, an issue on which we do not 
express an opinion. 
(Opinion, p.8.) 
Regarding the actual restitution award, Hurles claimed the award was not 
supported by substantial and competent evidence because, she argued, it 
included checks endorsed by the Morrisons, it did not factor in Hurles' claim that 
she "was only keeping between ten and twenty percent of the checks," and the 
restitution award includes losses outside the time period to which she pied guilty. 
8 
(Appellant's Brief, p.21.) With respect to this latter argument, the state noted 
Hurles' failure to acknowledge that the plea agreement allowed the state to seek 
restitution "on all DRs that were disclosed in discovery." (Brief of Respondent, 
p.24 (quoting 2/17/2011 Tr., p.1, Ls.21-21).) In reply, Hurles argued: (1) "[t]he 
mere fact that the State is going to seek restitution for certain amounts does not 
mean that Ms. Hurles expressly agreed to pay restitution for those amounts," and 
(2) the "term 'DRs' is ambiguous because it is not defined anywhere in the 
record" and the ambiguity must be resolved in her favor. (Reply Brief, pp. 7-8 
(emphasis original).) The Court of Appeals agreed with Hurles. (Opinion, pp.11 
13.) 
The state filed a timely petition for review. 
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ISSUE ON REVIEW 
Is review proper because the Idaho Court of Appeals' Opinion is contrary 
to precedent from this Court regarding (1) the proper interpretation of criminal 
plea agreements, (2) the application of fundamental error to claims raised for the 
first time on appeal in relation to plea agreements, (3) the requirement that an 
issue must be presented to the district court before it will be considered on 
appeal and whether State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 529, 923 P.2d 966 (1996), should 
be used to relieve an appellant of her burden to preserve an issue? Additionally, 
is review of the Court of Appeals' Opinion appropriate because the Court of 
Appeals considered an issue not heretofore addressed by this Court regarding 
what constitutes a waiver of the accountant-client privilege? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Review Is Appropriate Because The Idaho Court Of Appeals' Opinion Is Contrary 
To Idaho Supreme Court Precedent And Is Inconsistent With The Correct 
Interpretation Of Plea Agreements Under Both Contract Law And The 
Fundamental Error Standard Of Review 
A Introduction 
The state originally charged Hurles with two counts of grand theft. The 
first count alleged that, between December 30, 2008, and December 31, 2009, 
Hurles wrongfully took in excess of $1,000.00 "from the pull tab profits from the 
owner." (R., p.29.) The second count alleged that, between the same dates, 
Hurles wrongfully took in excess of $1,000.00 "from the ATM profits" of Crescent. 
(R., p.29.) Pursuant to an agreement, Hurles pied guilty to Count II and the state 
agreed to dismiss Count I. (2/17/2011 Tr., p.3, Ls.5-14.) The plea agreement 
also allowed the state to seek restitution "on all DRs that were disclosed in 
discovery." (2/17/2011 Tr., p.1, Ls.21-21.) In stating this term, the prosecutor 
further advised the court: "I have a list of those right here, but I think defense 
counsel understands the ones we're talking about." (2/17/2011 Tr., p.1, Ls.23-
24.) Defense counsel responded: "I do, Your Honor." (2/17/2011 Tr., p.1, Ls.23-
25.) The state also later noted, without objection, that the restitution would 
"include the dismissed charge as well." (2/17/2011 Tr., p.8, Ls.16-17.) 
Prior to sentencing, which occurred after the restitution hearing, the court 
also reiterated the terms of the agreement as to restitution, stating: "You are to 
pay restitution on all incidences, not simply the one grand theft charge, but the 
entire time that you were there working for the employer and any thefts that may 
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have occurred. So restitution was to cover all of that." (8/11/2011 Tr., p.103, 
Ls.18-23.) Hurles agreed that was her understanding. (8/11/2011 Tr., p.104, 
Ls.1-3.) Hurles' acknowledgement was also consistent with the restitution 
proceedings and the lack of any objection to the amounts requested or reflected 
in State's Exhibit 1 as being beyond the scope of the charging document or the 
terms of the plea agreement. (See generally 5/19/2011 Tr.) 
On appeal, Hurles argued, in part, "that I.C. §19-5304 only allows the 
district court to award restitution for the alleged thefts that occurred from 
December of 2008 to December of 2009, and any restitution which was based on 
thefts which occurred outside of that period should not have been included in the 
restitution order." (Appellant's Brief, p.27.) When confronted with the plea 
agreement, Hurles argued the state's ability to seek restitution did not mean she 
agreed to pay it and she asserted the term "DRs" is "ambiguous" and should be 
construed in her favor. (Reply Brief, pp.7-8.) The Court of Appeals reversed on 
these same theories. 
Review of this issue is appropriate because (1) the Court of Appeals 
completely disregarded the entire purpose of the restitution term, and (2) whether 
the Court of Appeals knows what the term "DR" means is irrelevant to whether 
the parties who negotiated the plea agreement understood the term and any 
ambiguity in the term prevents Hurles from meeting her burden of showing 
fundamental error. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
In reviewing an Idaho Court of Appeals' opinion, "this Court gives serious 
consideration to the views of the Court of Appeals, but directly reviews the 
decision of the lower court." State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206,207,207 P.3d 182, 
183 (2009) ( quotations and citation omitted). 
C. Heading 
Idaho Code § 19-5304(9) provides: "The court may, with the consent of 
the parties, order restitution to victims ... for economic loss or injury for crimes 
which are not adjudicated or are not before the court." The plea agreement in 
this case clearly contemplated an award of restitution for crimes that were not 
adjudicated - including "all DRs that were disclosed in discovery," which defense 
counsel had a list of, and the dismissed charge. (2/17/2011 Tr., p.1, Ls.21-25, 
p.8, Ls.15-17.) Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals found the state's use of the 
word "seek" as limiting any restitution award to the count to which Hurles pied, 
stating: 
[T]he plea agreement only notes that the State would "seek 
restitution." (Emphasis added.) The words of the agreement 
include no expression of consent by Hurles to pay any amount of 
restitution or to pay for any specified economic loss beyond the 
crime charged. The words of the agreement only inform the court 
of what the State would try to recover; "It did not relieve the State of 
its burden to prove the amount of restitution claimed .... " [ State v. 
Nienburg, 153 Idaho 491, 497-98, 283 P.3d 808, 814-15 (Ct. App. 
2012)]. Therefore, under the limitations of section 19-5304, 
restitution is limited to losses caused by the crime: embezzlement 
during the December 2008 to December 2009 time period. 
(Opinion, p.11.) 
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The Court of Appeals' analysis ignores the only purpose of the restitution 
term. The state has never argued that Hurles "consented" to pay a specific 
amount of restitution; obviously she did not. If that were true, there would have 
been no need for a restitution hearing. Logic, however, dictates that by including 
a term in the plea agreement that allowed the state to seek restitution "on all 
DRs," that Hurles would be required to pay restitution for the amounts proven in 
relation thereto - amounts the state would not otherwise be entitled to as a 
consequence of Hurles' guilty plea to a single count. Otherwise, the restitution 
term would be meaningless because the state could, by statute, seek restitution 
on Count II regardless of whether it was included in the plea agreement. State v. 
Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 258, 281 P.3d 90, 95 (2012) ("The parties could have 
included restitution in the written plea agreement if they wanted the agreement to 
contemplate the issue. When viewing the document within its four corners, the 
restitution order did not breach the contract as the issue was not contemplated in 
the plea agreement."). The Court of Appeals' conclusion that the restitution term 
in the plea agreement did not allow for an award of restitution for conduct 
extending beyond Count II is erroneous. 
The Court of Appeals also stated: 
[E]ven if this Court were to stretch the reading of the plea 
agreement to include consent, the plain language of the plea 
agreement does not express what Hurles consented to pay 
restitution for. To the extent that the plea agreement expressed 
consent to pay restitution "on all DRs," the record does not reveal 
what "DRs" are and if the "DRs" refer to some time period outside 
of the time period charged. The ambiguity as to what (if anything) 
Hurles agreed to pay restitution for or what "DRs" means, must be 
resolved in favor of the defendant. Therefore, restitution is 
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awardable only for embezzlement losses within the December 2008 
to December 2009 time period. 
(Opinion, p.12.) 
This Court has reviewed criminal plea agreements using contract law 
standards. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 281 P.3d 90; State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 
593, 226 P.3d 535 (2010). In this regard, the Court has stated: 
The determination of whether a contract is ambiguous or not is a 
question of law over which we may exercise free review, and in 
determining whether a contract is ambiguous, our task is to 
ascertain whether the contract is reasonably subject to conflicting 
interpretation. If a written contract is complete upon its face and 
unambiguous extrinsic evidence of prior or contemporaneous 
negotiations or conversations is not admissible to contradict, vary, 
alter, add to, or detract from the terms of the contract. If the 
language of the document is unambiguous, given its ordinary and 
well-understood meaning, we will not look beyond the four corners 
of the agreement to determine the intent of the parties. 
Gomez, 153 Idaho at 257, 281 P.3d at 94 (quotations, citations and ellipses 
omitted). 
The plea agreement in this case was not ambiguous. It clearly and 
unequivocally allowed the state to "seek restitution on all DRs that were 
disclosed in discovery." (2/17/2011 Tr., p.1, Ls.21-22.) Rather than expressing 
ignorance of what a "DR" is or confusion on what that term meant, defense 
counsel acknowledged he had a list of the DRs to which the prosecutor referred 
and never objected to the scope of the restitution hearing. Compare Peterson, 
148 Idaho at 597, 226 P.3d at 597 ("[T]he prosecutor has an affirmative duty to 
dispute the defendant's representation of the scope of the plea agreement, or to 
ask for further time to clarify the agreement. Otherwise silence shall be 
interpreted as acceptance of the stated terms."); cf. Hayes v. State, 146 Idaho 
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353, 355, 195 P.3d 712, 714 (Ct. App. 2008) (noting it could constitute deficient 
performance for an attorney to fail to object to a restitution request when the 
defendant was not "previously informed of that consequence"). In f~ct, at one 
point during the restitution hearing when defense counsel asked Jody Morrison 
about losses incurred between 2005 to 2010, she responded, "2004 to 201 O." 
(5/19/2011 Tr., p.73, Ls.11-13.) Defense counsel corrected Jody, stating: 
"Okay. We are not really dealing with 2004 because that's - I would just submit 
to the court, I think that the prosecutor and I both agree that's outside the statute 
of limitations. So we're not -- 2004 is not in the equation." (5/19/2011 Tr., p.73, 
Ls.14-19.) The prosecutor confirmed that the "spreadsheet" (State's Exhibit 1) 
and related restitution request only covers losses between 2005 to 2010 and 
does not extend back through 2004. (5/19/2011 Tr., p.73, L.20 - p.74, L.3.) It is 
apparent from the record that the parties who agreed to the restitution term were 
familiar not only with what a DR is, but the timeframe covered by the DRs for 
which the state was allowed to seek restitution. 5 That the term was not defined 
on the record for the benefit of appellate counsel or the appellate court does not 
make the term ambiguous and Hurles' effort to declare the term ambiguous, for 
the first time on appeal, deprives the state of the benefit of its bargain. See 
Peterson, 148 Idaho at 597, 226 P.3d at 539 (concluding that the state could not 
take the benefit of the bargain knowing what the defendant believed was 
5 The police reports accompanying the presentence report, which the Court of 
Appeals referenced in addressing Hurles' privilege came (Opinion, p.8), have 
"DR" numbers on them indicating that the term "DR" refers to police reports (see, 
.s9.,., PSI, pp.22-24). 
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included within the plea agreement and then deprive the defendant of what he 
understood his benefits to be under that same contract). 
Even if the Court agrees that "DR" is ambiguous because it is not defined, 
Hurles is still not entitled to relief. Hurles never asserted to the district court that 
any of the requested or rewarded restitution was beyond the scope of Count II. 
Because Hurles raises this issue for the first time on appeal, she must meet her 
burden of showing fundamental error. Gomez, 153 Idaho at 256, 281 P.3d at 93. 
In order to show fundamental error, Hurles must establish (1) a violation of an 
unwaived constitutional right, (2) clear or obvious error that is plain from the 
record, and (3) the error affected her substantial rights. kl The record does not 
show the state exceeded the scope of the restitution claim included in the plea 
agreement, and therefore does not support a finding of fundamental error. 
"If the State breached the plea agreement, the breach would go to the 
foundation of [Hurles'] rights; therefore it must be determined whether there was 
a breach." Gomez, 153 Idaho at 256,281 P.3d at 93. As noted, and as even the 
Court of Appeals' analysis suggests, there was no breach because, at a 
minimum, the plea agreement allowed the state to "seek restitution on all DRs 
that were disclosed in discovery." (2/17/2011 Tr., p.1, Ls.21-22.) Thus, even if 
the plea agreement did not require Hurles to pay restitution for the amounts 
sought and proved by the state, the state could not breach the plea agreement 
merely by asking for the restitution referenced in the plea agreement. 
Hurles' claim would also fail on the second prong of the fundamental error 
analysis. If the term "DR" is ambiguous, as Hurles and the Court of Appeals 
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claim, then the error cannot be clear or obvious. And, it is anything but plain from 
this record that the parties did not have a mutual understanding of the term "DR" 
or what the state would seek at the restitution hearing. In fact, the opposite is 
true. 
Because the Court of Appeals disregarded the purpose of the restitution 
term of the plea agreement and erroneously concluded that the term "DR" was 
an ambiguous term that should be construed against the state, all of which is 
contrary to Idaho Supreme Court precedent and controlling legal standards, this 
Court should grant review and conclude Hurles has failed to meet her burden of 
showing that the restitution sought by the state and awarded to the victims was 
erroneous. 
11. 
Review Is Appropriate Because The Court Of Appeals' Conclusion That The 
Victims' Accountant-Client Privilege Was Waived Is Contrary To Well-Established 
Precedent 
A. Introduction 
The Court of Appeals rejected the state's assertion that Hurles' claims 
regarding whether the accountant-client privilege was waived because, the Court 
concluded, the district "court's application of the privilege and exclusion of the 
accountant create[d] the adverse ruling that Hurles can appeal from." (Opinion, 
p.7.) If Hurles had challenged the district court's initial decision to exclude Mr. 
Warr based on its determination that the privilege was not waived in this case 
based on the fact that the Morrisons sued him in a different case - which was the 
argument Hurles made below - then the Court of Appeals' finding of an adverse 
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ruling would be correct. Since that is not what occurred, the Court's rejection of 
the state's waiver argument was erroneous and inconsistent with the well-
established rule that arguments must be preserved in order to be considered on 
appeal. Further, the Court of Appeals' statement that it need not consider the 
state's waiver argument is an unwarranted expansion of Zichko. Finally, the 
Court of Appeals' finding that there was a waiver is erroneous. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The general rule in Idaho is that the trial court has sole discretion in 
deciding whether to admit or exclude evidence." State v. Howard, 135 Idaho 
727, 24 P.3d 44, 48 (2001) (citation omitted). "Appellate courts review trial court 
decisions admitting or excluding evidence under the abuse of discretion 
standard." kt at 731-732, 24 P.3d at 48-49. "The trial court's broad discretion in 
the admission of evidence at trial will be reversed only when there has been a 
clear abuse of that discretion." kt at 732, 24 P.3d at 49. In evaluating a 
discretionary decision, this Court considers "1) whether the lower court rightly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion, 2) whether the court acted within the 
outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards 
applicable to specific choices, and 3) whether the court reached its decision by 
an exercise of reason." State v. Hoak, 147 Idaho 919,921,216 P.3d 1291, 1293 
(Ct. App. 2009) (citations omitted). 
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C. The Court Of Appeals, Contrary To Well-Established Precedent, Reversed 
The District Court On Grounds Never Presented To Or Ruled On By The 
District Court 
When the Morrisons first asserted their accountant-client privilege, Hurles 
argued the privilege was waived because the Morrisons had filed a lawsuit 
against Mr. Warr and that the lawsuit allowed Mr. Warr to "now defend himself." 
(8/4/2011 Tr., p.12, Ls.16-18.) The district court correctly rejected the lawsuit as 
a basis for waiving the privilege in this case. (8/4/2011 Tr., p.13, L.21 - p.14, 
L.24.) Indeed, Hurles did not claim the court's conclusion in this regard was 
erroneous. (See generally Appellant's Brief, pp.10-21.) Instead, Hurles proffered 
other grounds in support of her waiver argument (id.), some of which were at 
least similar to the arguments she made at the second restitution hearing 
(8/11/2011 Tr., p.95, Ls.18-21, p.96, Ls.5-16, p.96, L.22-p.97, L.7). The district 
court, however, never ruled on those grounds for waiver; nor was Hurles even 
prepared to present testimony from Mr. Warr at the second restitution hearing. 
(See 8/11/2011 Tr., p.95, L.13 - p.96, L.10.) Having no other evidence to 
consider at that time, the district court determined it would "order the restitution 
that[] [had] been proved to [it] at th[at] point" and gave Hurles "30 days in which 
to come and move for reconsideration if you think that's inappropriate and try -
and to prove ... that the . . . accountant/client relationship has been breached 
and that [Hurles would be] entitled, then, to bring the accountant in." (8/11/2011 
Tr., p.97, L.23 - p.98, L.7.) Trial counsel responded, "That would be fine" 
(8/11/2011 Tr., p.98, L.8), but never pursued the claim further. It is for this 
reason that the state submits Hurles failed to adequately preserve her claim 
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relating to whether the accountant-client privilege was waived. The district court 
asked counsel to research the issue, review the testimony from the first 
restitution hearing, and see what Judy "said in relationship to her accountant to 
determine whether or not there was [a] waiver." (8/11/2011 Tr., p.98, Ls.9-15.) 
The following exchange then occurred: 
[THE COURT:] Looks to me like the only thing that -- that 
stands between the restitution figure being requested and the client 
paying that amount is potentially whether or not the -- you can 
impeach the victim through the accountant. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Correct. 
THE COURT: Is that what you want to do? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Correct. 
(8/11/2011 Tr., p.98, L.22 - p.99, L.4.) 
Again, counsel did not do so and perhaps with good reason. For example, 
counsel may have decided, upon further discussion with Mr. Warr and review of 
Jody's testimony, that the privilege was not waived or that Mr. Warr could not, or 
would not, testify as to any statements Jody allegedly made to him during his 
representation of her. Whatever the motivation, or lack thereof, Hurles did not 
give the district court the opportunity to rule on the issue of waiver beyond 
rejecting her original claim that the waiver was the result of a separate lawsuit - a 
determination that Hurles does not challenge. Consequently, this Court should 
decline to consider Hurles' arguments. This Court's opinion in Zichko, supra, 
does not require the Court to disregard the state's preservation argument. 
In Zichko, this Court, citing I.AR. 35, stated: "When issues on appeal are 
not supported by propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will not be 
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considered." 129 Idaho at 263, 923 P.2d at 970. Thus, "[a] party waives an 
issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking, not just if both are 
lacking." kl In addressing the privilege issue, the Court of Appeals, relying on 
I.A.R. 35 and Zichko, said the state's argument that Hurles' failure to file a 
"motion to reconsider, as suggested by the trial court" resulted in abandonment 
of that claim "need not [be] consider[ed]" because the state "cite[d] no legal 
authority for its position that Hurles was required to move the district court to 
reconsider its decision to exclude the accountant in order to preserve the issue 
for appeal." (Opinion, pp.7-8.) The Court of Appeals' position on this point is 
flawed for at least two reasons. First, the state's preservation argument was 
supported by authority that stands for the proposition that the district court must 
be given an opportunity to rule on an issue in order for there to be an adverse 
ruling for the appellate court to consider. (Brief of Respondent, p.9 (citing State 
v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 378, 384, 987 P.2d 290, 296 (1999)).) Second, the Court of 
Appeals' characterization of the state's argument is incorrect. The state does not 
contend that a "post-trial motion" is necessary to "preserve an issue for appeal." 
(Opinion, p.8.) An appellant claiming error must, however, preserve the issue 
raised and obtain a ruling on that issue. That the district court ruled on an 
argument related to waiver does not mean that any argument Hurles desires to 
advance on appeal has been preserved. See State v. Fordyce, 151 Idaho 868, 
871, 264 P.3d 975, 978 (Ct. App. 2011) ("An objection on one ground will not 
preserve a separate and different basis for excluding the evidence."). The district 
court's ruling on Hurles' claim that the privilege was waived because the 
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Morrisons sued Mr. Warr was not adequate to preserve grounds for waiver later 
asserted, but not ruled on, much less grounds asserted for the first time on 
appeal. It is for these reasons that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding the 
state waived its preservation argument and should have instead held that Hurles 
waived her arguments on this issue. 
D. The Court Of Appeals' Conclusion That The Accountant-Client Privilege 
Was Waived, Based On Documents It Found Elsewhere In The Record, Is 
Contrary To Established Law 
Rule 515(b), I.R.E., sets forth the accountant-client privilege as follows: 
A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any 
other person from disclosing confidential communications made for 
the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional accounting 
services to the client which were made (1) between the client or the 
client's representative and the accountant or the accountant's 
representative, (2) between the accountant and the accountant's 
representative, or (3) by the client or the client's representative or 
the client's accountant or a representative of the accountant to an 
accountant or a representative of an accountant representing 
another concerning a matter of common interest, (4) between 
representatives of the client or between the client and a 
representative of the client, or (5) among accountants and their 
representatives representing the same client. 
The privilege is also codified in I.C. § 9-203A, which reads: "Any licensed 
public accountant, or certified public accountant, cannot, without the consent of 
his client, be examined as a witness as to any communication made by the client 
to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of professional employment." 
Disclosure to a third party may result in a waiver of the privilege. BAA, PLC v. 
Acacia Mutual Life Insurance Company, 929 A.2d 1, 17 (Md. 2007). 
The Court of Appeals erred in finding, for the first time on appeal, that the 
privilege was waived on the grounds that "the accountant had discussed the ATM 
23 
balance problem with police during the police investigation" and provided 
"documents originating from the accountant's firm" to law enforcement. (Opinion, 
p.8.) The flaw in this finding is that the state did not, as Hurles argued, "rel[y] on 
Mr. Warr's documents to calculate the amount of restitution." (Appellant's Brief, 
p.15.) At no time during the state's presentation of evidence in the restitution 
hearing did the prosecutor offer Mr. Warr's documents to "calculate the restitution 
amount." The documentary evidence admitted in support of the restitution 
request was the spreadsheet prepared by Allison Berriochoa, a paralegal at 
Givens Pursley, not Mr. Warr. While the Loss Statement - Request for 
Restitution Jody prepared and submitted to the presentence investigator has 
documents attached that appear to have been faxed by Mr. Warr's accounting 
firm, Wilson, Harrison & Co., Hurles' assertion that these documents were 
ultimately relied upon to support the restitution request is unsupported by the 
record. (PSI, pp.289-96 (Loss Statement - Request for Restitution); 8/4/2011 
Tr., p.10, L.19 - p.11, L.16 (Mr. Warr's testimony that he is a partner with Wilson 
Harrison Company and previously represented Crescent); see generally 
5/19/2011 Tr. (evidence offered in support of restitution hearing); State's Exhibit 
1 (spreadsheet with restitution amounts).) In fact, the cover letter from the 
Morrisons' attorney to the prosecutor that accompanied Ms. Berriochoa's 
spreadsheet states the "spreadsheet is based on the check and deposit records 
and U.S. Bank statements kept and provided by Butch and Jody Morrison." (PSI, 
p.187.) 
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The basis for Hurles' argument to the contrary is defense counsel's 
comments from the second restitution hearing where he stated: "here is my 
problem. They're going to use Mr. Warr's documents for the presentence 
investigation, they can't claim privilege and turn around and say, okay, he can't 
testify as to what those documents are." (Appellant's Brief, p.15 (quoting 
8/4/2011 Tr., p.17, Ls.12-16).) Hurles has taken this comment out of context. 
That comment was made in response to a statement by the prosecutor wherein 
she noted that, based on the information in the police reports, Mr. Warr's "view 
[was] that there was a theft, and the fact that it was over $100,000 is already 
documented in the police reports." (8/4/2011 Tr., p.17, Ls.5-7.) It is in response 
to that statement that defense counsel commented about the state's alleged 
"use" of Mr. Warr's documents. However, as noted by the district court, the 
state's point was not that it was relying on Mr. Warr's documents to prove the 
amount owed but to show that "even if Mr. Warr testifies, he's still saying that 
there's only $100,000." (8/4/2011 Tr., p.17, Ls.14-19.) Indeed, it would be 
curious for the state to attempt to "rely" on Mr. Warr's documents at the August 4 
hearing when it had already proven the restitution at the May 19 hearing using 
the spreadsheet prepared by Ms. Berriochoa, which was "based on the check 
and deposit records and U.S. bank statements kept and provided by Butch and 
Jody Morrison." (PSI, p.187.) 
Hurles also notes that Jody testified at the restitution hearing that she had 
"records from [her] then accountant, James Warr, who showed an imbalance in 
the credits and the debits of the ATM of checks written to the ATM." (Appellant's 
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Brief, p.16 (quoting 5/19/2011 Tr., p.72, Ls.2-5).) Jody then referenced that the 
differences were reflected in "column 4." (Appellant's Brief, p.16 (quoting 
5/19/2011 Tr., p.72, Ls.7-8).) That Morrison may have obtained accounting 
records from Mr. Warr does not, however, mean the state relied on his "work 
product" to calculate the restitution award. While Mr. Warr's accounting records 
may have uncovered the imbalance, the actual work product used in calculating 
the loss was prepared by Ms. Berriochoa, not Mr. Warr, and Jody's reference to 
"column 4" is clearly a reference to column 4 in State's Exhibit 1, not to any 
document created by Mr. Warr. 
Further, Hurles seems to misunderstand the distinction between whether 
Mr. Warr could discuss the preparation of a certain document if the state had 
relied on it and the ability to go beyond that and disclose confidential 
communications between him and the Morrisons. Laying foundation for or 
explaining the meaning of a document does not mean the Morrisons would 
implicitly waive any privilege between them and their accountant. Nevertheless, 
because Hurles' contention that the state relied on Mr. Warr's documents to 
"calculate the amount of restitution" is belied by the record, her claim that the 
Morrisons' implicitly waived the accountant-client privilege as a result fails. 
Hurles also argued Jody "waived the privilege because she disclosed 
communications between herself and Mr. Warr." (Appellant's Brief, p.17.) 
Hurles, however, was unclear about what communications she contends Jody 
disclosed. Her first argument was based on defense counsel's statements at the 
second restitution hearing where he commented that, based on his "recollection," 
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Jody testified "about conversations she had with her accountant." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.17.) But Hurles did not identify testimony she believes waived the 
privilege beyond the fact that, on cross-examination, she testified that "Mr. Warr 
told her about a $1,300.00 accounting discrepancy, and that he had created new 
booking procedures for [Crescent] after discovering various accounting problems 
and [the] theft." (Appellant's Brief, p.17 (citing 5/19/2011 Tr., p.62, L.24 - p.70, 
L.11 ).) This testimony was in response to cross-examination generally designed 
to imply that money missing from the A TM was, at least in part, attributable to 
Jody and Butch "borrowing" money from it. (5/19/2011 Tr., p.62, L.24 - p.70, 
L.11.) However, "[a]s a general rule, a party does not waive the privilege by 
denying the opposing party's accusations .... In addition, a Court cannot justify 
finding a waiver of privileged information merely to provide the opposing party 
information helpful to its cross-examination or because information is relevant." 
Sears1 Roebuck & Co. v. Gussin, 714 A.2d 188 (Md. 1998) (citations and 
quotations omitted). Further, it is difficult to imagine how responding to questions 
on cross-examination about the fact Mr. Warr alerted Jody to an accounting 
discrepancy regarding the ATM resulted in a waiver of the privileged 
communications between her and Mr. Warr. 
In conjunction with her waiver argument, Hurles also asserted that Mr. 
Warr's testimony "was necessary because it is the only means by which the 
district court and Ms. Hurles could get an accurate restitution estimate" since it 
was Mr. Warr who "c[a]me up with an amount of loss from the ATM." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.19.) Hurles further asserted: "Since [she] was cashing 
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checks, then returning a portion of the proceeds into the ATM, there is no way of 
calculating the restitution without the [sic] Mr. Warr's testimony." (Appellant's 
Brief, pp.19-20.) This argument is nonsensical. While Mr. Warr at one point 
provided information to the Morrisons regarding the discrepancies in the ATM, it 
does not logically follow that he is the only person who could calculate the 
Morrisons' loss. Not even defense counsel suggested as much. To the contrary, 
defense counsel's position was not that Mr. Warr was the only person qualified to 
calculate restitution, it was that Mr. Warr's testimony was needed to obtain "the 
admissions made by the alleged victims in this case." (8/4/2011 Tr., p.22, Ls.8-
9.) 
In a related argument, Hurles argued Mr. Warr's testimony was necessary 
to "impeach" Jody "over her assertion that the Morrisons were not taking money 
out of the ATM." (Appellant's Brief, p.20.) In support of this argument, Hurles 
recites defense counsel's question on cross-examination of Jody, "Didn't your 
accountant actually confront you with the checks signed and endorsed by Butch, 
and you denied it for five months?" (Appellant's Brief, p.20 (quoting 5/19/2011 
Tr., p.69, Ls.22-24 (alteration by Hurles omitted).) Hurles then asserts, "If 
defense counsel's position is true, then [Jody] lied to the court by inflating the 
amount of money Ms. Hurles stole from them." (Appellant's Brief, p.20.) The 
fundamental problem with Hurles' argument is that there is no evidence that 
defense counsel's "position is true." The fact that he implied something through 
cross-examination does not make it so. Nor did defense counsel ever offer 
evidence that Mr. Warr could impeach Jody on this point even though the court 
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invited him to do so. Hurles is not entitled to relief based upon suppositions she 
failed to support with evidence in the district court. 
Because Hurles abandoned her waiver claim, the Court should grant 
review and decline to consider the issue. Even if considered, this Court should 
conclude Hurles has failed to demonstrate any error in relation to the exclusion of 
Mr. Warr's testimony. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court grant review and, on review, 
affirm the restitution order entered by the district court. 
DATED this 18th day of March, 2014. 
JESSjlCA M. LORELLO 
De~ty Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 18th day of March, 2014, served a 
true and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REVIEW by causing a copy addressed to: 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
29 
APPENDIX A 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 39219 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
Y. 
KRISTI L. HURLES, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
2014 Opinion No.: 3 
Filed: January 17, 2014 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
_________________ ) 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada 
County. Hon. Darla S. Williamson, District Judge. 
Order of restitution reversed in part and affirmed in part, and case remanded. 
Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Shawn F. Wilkerson, Deputy 
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Shawn F. Wilkerson argued. 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy 
Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Jessica M. Lorello argued. 
GUTIERREZ, Chief Judge 
Kristi L. Hurles appeals from the judgment of conviction I entered upon her guilty plea to 
one count of grand theft, in violation of Idaho Code §§ 18-2403(2)(b) and 18-2407(1 )(b ). After 
holding restitution hearings, the district court ordered Hurles to pay $204,174.61 in restitution, 
under Idaho Code § 19-5304, for embezzlement2 losses and the victim's attorney fees. Hurles 
argues the district court erred by determining that the holders of the accountant-client privilege 
Although Hurles appeals from the judgment of conviction, this appeal primarily 
challenges the restitution order accompanying the judgment of conviction. 
2 Embezzlement and theft are used interchangeably throughout this opinion. In Idaho, theft 
is a single offense superseding the separate theft offenses, such as embezzlement. Idaho Code 
§ 18-2401. Prior to being repealed, and traditionally, embezzlement referred to theft of personal 
property by a person who was entrusted with the property by the owner of the property, such as 
an employee. See Sparrow v. State, 102 Idaho 60, 62, 625 P .2d 414, 416 (1981) ( quoting 
since-repealed Idaho Code § 18-2413 defining the crime of embezzlement). 
did not impliedly consent to waive the privilege. Hurles also contends the district court abused 
its discretion by awarding restitution for the alleged embezzlement that occurred outside of the 
time period of the theft Hurles pied guilty to. Furthermore, Hl1rles claims the restitution award 
for the embezzlement losses is not based on substantial evidence. As for the attorney fees 
restitution avvard, Hurles maintains that the district court abused its discretion by a\varding 
attorney fees incurred by the victim for civil cases. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the 
restitution order in part, affirm in part, and remand the case to the district court. 
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
The evidence adduced at the restitution hearings reveals that Hurles worked for a Boise 
bar and grille (the business and victim) for a total of twenty years. She was a trusted employee 
and most recently served as the business's bookkeeper. Hurles also served as a bartender. One 
of Hurles' duties as a bartender was to sell Idaho State Lottery pull-tabs and to pay out on the 
winning pull-tabs. As the bookkeeper, Hurles was one of two employees, besides the owners, 
authorized to stock the on-site ATM with petty cash; Hurles, though, was primarily responsible 
for stocking the ATM. Hurles would also often make the daily deposit at the bank. 
After noticing that the business was not receiving the expected commissions from the 
pull-tab operation, the owners of the business contacted the Idaho State Lottery. The Idaho State 
Lottery conducted an investigation and determined that Hurles had inflated the pay-out amounts 
of winning pull-tabs, keeping the excess amounts for herself. In a letter to the Ada County 
Prosecutor, the Idaho State Lottery Enforcement Division informed the prosecutor of its 
determination that Hurles had embezzled approximately $10,000 via inflated lottery pull-tab 
payouts. 
The business O\vners also contacted the Boise Police Department because they were made 
aware of a discrepancy involving petty cash replenishment checks. An on-site ATM was owned 
by a third party, but operated by the business. The business was responsible for placing cash in 
the ATM. The ATM owner would reimburse the business for amounts withdrawn from the 
ATM and pay the business a po1tion of the fee collected on each transaction. When the A TM 
needed to be refilled, a process was implemented to replenish the ATM with cash from the petty 
cash safe and to track the replenishment of the petty cash through an "IOU" marker and a 
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replenishment check. 3 The petty cash replenishment check was to be deposited in the business's 
bank account with the other daily receipts; the amount of petty cash originally removed to 
replenish the ATM, as written on the replenishment check, was to be replaced with the daily cash 
receipts. The goal of the process was to maintain a steady balance of petty cash in the petty cash 
safe and to keep track of the amount of money placed in the ATM. After the Boise Police 
Department began their investigation, Hurles admitted to the police that she had taken money 
from the business; she estimated she had taken around $20,000 to $50,000. There is no dispute 
that Hurles was cashing checks and retaining monies she was supposed to deposit into the 
business's bank account. 
As a result, Hurles was charged by information with two counts of grand theft, each 
occurring "on or between the 30th day of December, 2008 and the 31st day of December, 2009." 
(for simplicity, this is referred to as the December 2008 to December 2009 time period). One 
count related to the lottery pull-tab commissions; the other count related to the petty cash 
replenishment checks. Hurles and the prosecutor reached a plea agreement wherein Hurles 
agreed to plead gt1ilty to the count relating to the petty cash replenishment checks and the State 
agreed to dismiss the other count. The plea agreement was not reduced to writing, but was 
instead offered into the record orally by the prosecutor at the plea hearing. Following the plea 
hearing, the district court scheduled a restitution hearing and requested a presentence 
investigation (PSJ) report be prepared. 
At the first restitution hearing, the State presented testimony from three witnesses: an 
Idaho State Lottery investigator; a paralegal, employed by the law firm retained by the business, 
who prepared a spreadsheet of losses related to the petty cash replenishment checks; and one of 
The detailed process of replenishing the A TM with cash was as fol lows: ( l) Hurles 
would check the ATM and note that the A TM was low on funds; (2) Hurles would remove petty 
cash from the petty cash safe and place the money in the A TM; (3) Hurles would place an "JOU" 
marker in the petty cash safe with a notation written for the amount of cash removed from the 
petty cash safe; (4) an owner would write a check in the amount of the IOU marker and replace 
the IOU marker in the petty cash safe with the replenishment check--the petty cash 
replenishment check was to have "ATM" written in the memorandum line; (5) Hurles would 
collect the daily cash receipts from the previous day in a bank bag; (6) Hurles would "sell" the 
replenishment check to the daily cash receipts bag--that is, Hurles would take the check out of 
the petty cash safe, place the check in the bank bag, and remove the amount of the replenishment 
check in cash from the bank bag and place the cash in the petty cash safe; and (7) Hurles would 
deposit the daily receipts bank bag, including the replenishment checks, at the business's bank. 
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the owners of the business. The lottery investigator testified to the steps she used in determining 
that the business was short $ l 0,000 from the lottery pull-tab commissions. The paralegal 
testified that she reviewed copies of checks provided by the owners and then constructed a 
spreadsheet based on her review of the checks. The spreadsheet was entered into evidence. The 
spreadsheet contained "a small portion of the universe of checks" the paralegal reviewed because 
it contained only the checks that were cashed. 
The paralegal testified she reached a total of $153,920 in petty cash replenishment check 
losses from 2005 through 20 I 0. This total was based on the sum of cashed checks that were; 
(I) stamped "for deposit only," but endorsed by Hurles (totaling $7,200); (2) unstamped, but 
endorsed by Hurles (totaling $27,760); (3) stamped "for deposit only," but with the stamp 
stricken and endorsed by Hurles (totaling $4,300); and ( 4) stamped "for deposit only," but not 
endorsed (totaling $114,660). Excluded from the restitution total, according to the paralegal, 
were cashed checks that were: (I) stamped "for deposit only," but endorsed by someone other 
than Hurles (totaling $11, l 00); (2) unstamped and not endorsed (totaling $99, 11 0); 
(3) unstamped, but endorsed by someone other than Hurles (totaling $5,400); (4) unstamped, but 
signed by an unauthorized signatory (totaling $4, I 00); (5) stamped with the business's typical 
deposit stamp, but not stamped "for deposit only" (totaling $500); and (6) stamped "for deposit 
only," but with the stamp stricken and endorsed by someone other than Hurles (totaling $6,600). 
One of the owners of the business testified and was cross-examined by Hurles' defense 
attorney. Following this witness, Hurles' defense attorney informed the district court that he 
wished to call the business's accountant. The district court then scheduled a second restitution 
hearing. 
At the second restitution hearing, Hurles' defense attorney called the business's 
accountant to testify. The accountant testified to his employment and confirmed the business 
was a client. Hurles' defense attorney asked the accountant if the accountant was familiar with 
the A TM balance problem, to which the accountant said yes. The defense attorney then asked 
the accountant to describe the nature of the A TM balance problem. At that point, the prosecutor 
informed the court that the owners of the business wished to assert their accountant-client 
privilege. After discussion between the court, Hurles' defense attorney and the prosecutor, the 
court excused the accountant from the stand. Also during the second restitution hearing, the 
prosecutor oITered a revised total embezzlement loss of $155,440, including both the lottery and 
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petty cash replenishment check losses, after correcting some errors discovered and in the 
period first hearing. 4 The court continued the hearing. 
At the third restitution hearing and sentencing, Hurles' defense attorney informed the 
court that the defense had no other witnesses. Hurles' defense attorney, the prosecutor, and the 
court then began a discussion concerning the accountant and whether the accountant-client 
privilege had been waived. following the discussion, the court moved forward with sentencing 
and heard statements from the owners, arguments from the prosecutor and defense attorney, and 
heard a statement from Hurles. The district court then sentenced Hurles to a unified term of 
fourteen years, with two years determinate, and ordered restitution in favor of the business in the 
amounts of $155,440 for embezzlement losses5 and $48,734.61 for attorney fees for civil cases. 
Hurles appeals. 
II. 
ANALYSIS 
Hurles argues four points on appeal: (!) the district coutt erred by determining that the 
owners of the business did not impliedly consent to waive their accountant-client privilege; 
(2) the district court abused its discretion by awarding restitution for the alleged embezzlement 
that occurred outside of the time period of theft Hurles pied guilty to; (3) the restitution award 
for the embezzlement losses is not based on substantial evidence;6 and (4) the district court 
abused its discretion by awarding attorney fees incurred by the business for civil cases. 
A. The Accountant-Client Privilege 
Hurles argues the district court ened by determining that the business owners did not 
impliedly consent to waive their accountant-client privilege. Hurles maintains that the owners 
4 At the first restitution hearing, the initial claimed total embezzlement loss was $163,920, 
including the $ I 0,000 Idaho State Lottery pull tab loss and the $153,920 petty cash 
replenishment check loss. We infer, based on the record, that the petty cash replenishment check 
loss was reduced to $145,440. 
5 Part of the embezzlement losses included theft related to an Idaho State Lottery pull tab 
operation. This portion of the restitution award, in the amount of $10,000, is not challenged on 
appeal. 
6 Because \Ve reverse as to the award of restitution for the embezzlement losses and 
remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion, we need not address whether the 
restitution award for the embezzlement losses is based on substantial evidence. 
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relied on accountant's documents to calculate the amount of restitution and injected the issue 
of accountant's work. Additionally, Hurles contends the testifying owner waived the 
privilege because the owner disclosed communications between herself and the accountant, and 
Hurles contends both owners waived the privilege when they had Hurles' defense attorney speak 
with the accountant about the amount of restitution. Hurles claims the accountant's testimony is 
needed to obtain an accurate restitution estimate and to impeach the owner who testified. The 
State argues Hurles abandoned her claim below because Hurles never allowed the district court 
to make an adverse ruling. Alternatively, the State contends the owners did not impliedly waive 
their accountant-client privilege. Ultimately the issue is whether, in ruling on the 
accountant-client privilege, the district court improperly excluded testimony from the accountant 
Under Idaho Rule of Evidence 51 S(b), 7 an accountant's client "has a privilege to refuse 
to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made 
for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional accounting services to the client" 
made in certain circumstances, The client can be a person, a corporation, or an association. 
LR.E. 51 S(a)( I). Confidential communications include those "not intended to be disclosed to 
third persons other than those to whom disclosure is made in furtherance of the rendition of 
professional accounting services to the client or those reasonably necessary for the transmission 
of the communication." LR.E. 5 I 5(a)(5). 
We review the district cornt's decision to admit evidence under an abuse of discretion 
standard. State v. Thorngren, 149 Idaho 729, 731, 240 P.3d 575, 577 (20 I 0). The same standard 
applies in reviewing a district court's application of a privilege. E.g., United States v. i\tfejia, 655 
F Jd 126, 13 l (2d Cir. 2011) (stating the court has repeatedly held that rulings on claims of 
attorney-client privilege are reviewed for an abuse of discretion). When a trial court's 
discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry 
to determine: (I) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; 
(2) whether the lower cou1t acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with 
any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court 
The accountant-client privilege is codified at Idaho Code § 9-203A. We refer to Idaho 
Rule of Evidence 515, as the evidentiary rule supersedes the statute in any potential conflict with 
the statutory section. l.R.B. 1102. 
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reached by an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 fdaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 
!331,1333(1 
We initially address the State's contention that Hurles abandoned her claim concerning 
the waiver of the accountant-client privilege. According to the State, Hurles cannot properiy 
raise the issue on appeal because the district court was not given the opportunity to make a ruling 
on whether the prlviiege had been waived. The State cites to State v. Barnes, l 33 Idaho 378, 987 
P.2d 290 (1999), where the Idaho Supreme Court stated, "This Court will not 'review a trial 
court's alleged error on appeal unless the record discloses an adverse ruling which forms the 
basis for the assignment of error."' Barnes, 133 Idaho at 384,987 P.2d at 296 (quoting State v. 
Fisher, 123 Idaho 481,485,849 P.2d 942,946 (1993)). At the second restitution hearing, Hurles 
called the accountant as an adverse witness. After laying a foundation, Hurles' defense attorney 
inqllired of the accountant the nature of the A TM discrepancy. At this point, the prosecutor 
informed the court that the owners wished to exercise their accountant-client privilege. 8 The 
court, after additional discussion with the attorneys, recognized the privilege and excused the 
witness. The corn1's application of the privilege and exclusion of the accountant creates the 
adverse ruling that Hurles can appeal from. CJ State v. Jwakiri, 106 Idaho 618,621,682 P.2d 
571, 574 ( 1984) (reviewing, on appeal, the trial court's ruling that the attorney-client privilege 
was waived, which allowed the attorney to testify at trial). The fact that Hurles' defense attorney 
did not file a motion to reconsider, as suggested by the trial court, does not translate to 
abandonment of the privilege waiver claim. The State's argument to the contrary cites no legal 
authority for its position that Hurles was required to move the district court to reconsider its 
8 At the second restitution hearing, after Hurles' defense attorney asked a few foundational 
questions of the accountant, the following exchange occurred: 
[Defense Attorney]: 
I Accountant]: 
[Defense Attorney]: 
(Accountant]: 
[Prosecutor]: 
[The Court]: 
[Prosecutor): 
And at some point, did it come to your knowledge that there was a 
controversy or a prob I em with the A TM balance at the [business]? 
Yes. 
Could you just describe to the corn1 what the nature of that was? 
The A TM machine--the nature of the accounting was that checks 
would be written--
Yam Honor, just for the record--! apologize--[the owners of the 
business] would be interested in asserting their privilege to the 
attorney client privilege undet; [daho--
ls he an attorney? 
l mean, accountant client privilege. 
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decision to exclude the accountant in order to preserve the issue for appeal. Without legal 
authority, the State has waived the argument, and we need not consider it. Idaho Appellate 
Rule 35; State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996). Moreover, there is 
nothing in the Idaho Supreme Court's rules requiring such a post-trial motion to preserve an 
issue for appeal. In consequence, Hurles has not abandoned the privilege waiver issue. 
At the point the privilege was asserted, the question by defense counsel inquired of the 
accountant's understanding of the problem with the ATM balance. As the PSI report reveals, the 
accountant had discussed the ATM balance problem with police during the police investigation. 
A Boise Police Department report, included in the PSI report, states that the accountant 
explained to the police how he determined the losses relating to the replenishment check 
embezzlement Moreover, the same police repoit references documents originating from the 
accountant's firm that were included in the PSI repo11. These communications--which were 
made to a third party, the Boise Police Department--are not covered by Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 515. See Farr v. Mischler, 129 Idaho 201,207,923 P.2d 446,452 (1996) ("To be a 
confidential communication the communication must 'not be intended to be disclosed to third 
persons.' I.R.E. 502(a)(5). Farr's argument fails because he did not act in a manner indicating 
that the communication was to be confidential."). Considering that the accountant's information 
recited to the police directly dealt with the embezzlement losses, we must reverse the restitution 
order as to the award of restitution for embezzlement losses and remand to the district court so 
that Hurles may pursue the accountant's testimony. On remand, the district court may have to 
address the applicability of the accountant-client privilege to other testimony by the accountant, 
an issue on which we do not express an opinion. 
B. The Restitution Award 
In addition to the accountant-client privilege issue, we address two specific challenges 
raised by Hurles attacking the embezzlement losses and attorney fees in the restitution award. 
Under the statutory scheme of Idaho Code § 19-5304, a district court must order restitution, 
unless inappropriate or undesirable, if the district cowt finds the defendant guilty of a crime that 
resulted in economic loss to the victim and the victim actually suffers the loss. LC. 
§ 19-5304(2). Economic loss is based on a preponderance of evidence submitted by the 
prosecutor, defendant, victim, and presentence investigator. LC. § 19-5304(6). The court may 
consider hearsay in the PSI report. Id.; I.R.E. l O l (d)(7). In determining the amount of 
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the court must consider factors enumerated in section 19-5304(7). The restitution 
amount awarded under section 19-5304(2) must be causally related to the crime--both actual 
proximate cause must be satisfied. State v. Corb11s, 150 Idaho 599, 602, 249 P.3d 398, 40 l 
(20 l l ). In addition, "The court may, with the consent of the parties, order restitution to victims 
and/or any other person or entity, for economic loss or injury for crimes which are not 
adjudicated or are not before the court." J.C.§ 19-5304(9); accord State v. Hargis, 126 Idaho 
727, 730, 889 P.2d 11 l 7, 1120 (Ct. App. 1995). That is, even if the losses are not causally 
related to the crime, a defendant may consent to pay restitution. 
On appeal, we review the decision to order restitution and the amount of restitution for an 
abuse of discretion, guided by the consideration of the factors enumerated in section 19-5304(7). 
Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602, 249 P.3d at 40 I. When a trial court's discretionary decision is 
reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether 
the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower cowt 
acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards 
applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision 
by an exercise of reason. Hedger, 115 Idaho at 600, 768 P.2d at 1333. 
1. Embezzlement loses 
Hurles argues the district court abused its discretion when it included restitution for 
checks that were cashed between 2005 and November 2008 and January 2009 through 20 l O. 
The testimony of the paralegal presented the sum of embezzlement losses from 2005 through 
20 I 0. Hurles was charged by information with grand theft during the December 2008 to 
December 2009 time period. The crime to which Hurles pied guilty was grand theft during the 
December 2008 to December 2009 time period. Therefore, under section 19-5304(2), the district 
court was allowed to award restitution for losses suffered by the business during the December 
2008 to December 2009 time period, as long as the losses were causally related to the crime 
charged. See State v. Schultz, l 48 Idaho 884, 886-87, 23 l P.3d 529, 530-3 l (Ct. App. 2008). 
The district court may award restitution for losses not caused by the adjudicated crime 
with the consent of the parties. J.C. § 19-5304(9). Generally, consent to pay restitution beyond 
the adjudicated crime is found in the plea agreement in cases where the defendant pleads guilty 
via a plea agreement. E.g., State v. Shafer, 144 Idaho 370, 161 P.3d 689 (Ct. App. 2007) 
(determining that restitution could not be awarded under section I 9-5304(2), but restitution could 
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be awarded under section 19-5304(9) because 
restitution in an "amount to be determined"). 
defendant agreed in the plea agreement to pay 
When a plea is offered pursuant to a plea agreement, "the court shall, on the record, 
require the disclosure of the agreement in open court or, on a showing of good cause, in camera, 
at tbe time the plea is offered." ldaho Criminal Rule 11 (f)(2). Full disclosure of the plea 
agreement on the record is necessary because, among other reasons, "[i]t is impossible for a trial 
judge to properly administer a plea agreement if it consists of secret terms known only to the 
parties." Baker v. United States, 78 l F.2d 85, 90 (6th Cir. l 986). If a plea agreement has not 
been reduced to writing, "it is incumbent upon the attorneys to state the agreement in its entirety 
on the record, and in a clear and coherent manner." State v. Banuelos, 124 Idaho 569, 575, 861 
P.2d 1234, 1240 (Ct. App. 1993); accord State v. Ruthe,ford, 107 Idaho 9 l 0, 914, 693 P.2d 
11 12, 1116 (Ct. App. 1985). 
Plea agreements are contractual in nature and generally are examined by comts in 
accordance with contract law standards. State v. Allen, ! 43 Idaho 267, 272, 141 P .3d l l 36, 1141 
(Ct. App. 2006). "As with other contracts, provisions of plea agreements are occasionally 
ambiguous; the government 'ordinarily must bear responsibility for any lack of clarity."' Slate v. 
Peterson, 148 Idaho 593,596,226 P.3d 535,538 (2010) (quoting United States v. De la Fuente, 
8 F.3d 1333, l 338 (9th Cir. 1993)). "[A ]mbiguities are construed in favor of the defendant. 
Focusing on the defendant's reasonable understanding also reflects the proper constitutional 
focus on what induced the defendant to plead guilty." Id. (quoting De la Fuente, 8 F.3d at 1337 
n.7) (alteration in original). See also State v. Fuhriman, 137 Idaho 741, 745, 52 P.3d 886, 890 
(Ct. App, 2002); State v. Cole, 135 [daho 269, 272, 16 P.3d 945, 948 (Ct. App. 2000). The 
determination that a plea agreement is ambiguous is a question of law; however, interpretation of 
an ambiguous term is a question of fact. Allen, 143 Idaho at 272, 141 P .3d at I I 41. Factual 
determinations made by a trial court will not be set aside on review unless they are clearly 
erroneous. Peter:s·on, 148 Idaho at 595, 226 P.3d at 537. 
In State v. Nienburg, 153 Idaho 491, 283 P.3d 808 (Ct. App. 2012), N ienburg entered into 
a plea agreement that provided, "Restitution is not lo exceed $1, 156.98." Id. at 493, 283 P.3d at 
8 IO (emphasis added). Nienburg contended that $1088.98 for vehicle repairs, resulting from 
damage to a police vehicle caused by Nienburg's dog that escaped when Nienburg fled, was not 
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as part the restitution for the crime Nienburg pied to, driving under the influence. On 
appeal we determined the plea agreement was unambiguous: 
The words of the agreement include no expression of consent by Nienburg to pay 
any amount of restitution or to pay for any specified economic loss. They also do 
not express any consent by Nienburg to pay for restitution that was not 
proximately caused by his DUI, the offense to which he pleaded guilty. The 
stated agreement was a cap on the amount of restitution to which Nienburg could 
be subjected, and nothing more. 
Id. at 497, 283 PJd at 814. Accordingly, we concluded: 
[E]xcept for setting a cap on the amount that may be awarded, the plea agreement 
did not alter the operation of the Idaho restitution statutes. It did not relieve the 
State of its burden to prove any amount of restitution claimed, nor did it subject 
Nienburg to payment of restitution not proximately caused by the offense to 
which he pleaded guilty. 
Id at 497-98, 283 P Jd at 814-15. 
In this case, the plea agreement's provision concerning restitution was not reduced to 
writing, but was instead orally offered into the record by the prosecution. The prosecutor stated: 
Your Honor, the state's going to recommend a unified sentence of l 4 
years, 2 years fixed with 12 indeterminate. The state is going to seek restitution 
on all DRs that were disclosed in discovery. I have a list of those right here, but I 
think defense counsel understands the ones we're talking about. 
(Emphasis added.) There are two issues with this plea agreement. First, the plea agreement only 
notes that the State would "seek restitution." (Emphasis added.) The words of the agreement 
include no expression of consent by Hurles to pay any amount of restitution or to pay for any 
specified economic loss beyond the crime charged. The words of the agreement only inform the 
court of what the State would try to recover; "It did not relieve the State of its burden to prove 
any amount of restitution claimed .... " Id. Therefore, under the limitations of section 19-5304, 
restitution is limited to losses caused by the crime: embezzlement during the December 2008 to 
December 2009 time period. Second, even if this Cowi were to stretch the reading of the plea 
agreement to include consent, the plain language of the plea agreement does not express what 
Hurles consented to pay restitution for. To the extent that the plea agreement expressed consent 
to pay restitution "on all DRs," the record does not reveal what "DRs" are and if the "DRs" refer 
to some time period outside of the time period charged. The ambiguity as to what (if anything) 
Hurles agreed to pay restitution for or what "DRs" means, must be resolved in favor of the 
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defendant. Therefore, restitution is awardable for embezzlement losses within the 
December 2008 to December 2009 period. 
The State suggests that Hurles consented to pay restitution at the third restitution hearing 
and sentencing nearly six months after Hudes agreed to the plea agreement and entered a guilty 
plea in reliance on the agreement. At the third restitution hearing, the district court addressed 
restitution as part of the sentencing: 
[The Court]: 
[Hurles]: 
(Emphasis added.) 
All right. Let's go ahead and go forward with 
sentencing. So the restitution ... the court does order at 
this time [is] $204,174. 
Ms. Hurles, you previously appeared in court, and 
you pied guilty to grand theft, Count fl; and Count I was 
dismissed. The state is going to recommend an underlying 
sentence of two years fixed plus l 2 indeterminate for a total 
of 14 years. You are to pay restitution on all incidences, 
not simply the one grand theft charge, but the entire time 
that you were there working for the employer and any 
thefts that may have occurred. So restitution was to cover 
all of that. The state is going to ask for imposition, that you 
go to the penitentiary, and you 're free to argue for 
something different. 
Is that your understanding of the prior proceedings, 
Ms. Hurles? 
Yes, ma'am. 
We are not convinced that Hurles' statement to the court is consent to pay restitution. 
Instead, the statement merely offers Hurles' acquiescence to the court's description of what had 
happened in prior proceedings. Moreover, a defendant's acquiescence to a district court's error 
in recalling what the plea agreement was does not pollute the waters upstream. As we 
recognized in Nienburg, the district court's error applying the restitution statute or recalling the 
restitution terms does not obliterate the plea agreement that the defendant and the State agreed to, 
nor is the State's statutory burden changed. What is more, if we accept the State's contention, it 
would be quite perplexing for a district court to announce that it is ordering restitution and then 
seek consent when section 19-5304(9) mandates the court to first have "the consent of the 
parties" in order to award restitution outside of section 19-5304(2). 
In sum, the record reveals that Hurles pied guilty to embezzlement during the December 
2008 to December 2009 time period. Hurles' plea agreement does not express Hurles' consent to 
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in contrast, it reflects that the State would "seek" The record does not 
Hurles consented to pay restitution for crimes at the sentencing hearing 
held more than six months aner the plea agreement was entered into the record. On remand, in 
accordance wlth section 19-5304, restitution ls awardable for embezzlement losses during the 
December 2008 to December 2009 time period, the time period of theft that Hurles pied guilty 
to. 
2. Attorney fees 
Hurles also contends the district court abused its discretion by awarding restitution for 
attorney fees incurred by the business for civil cases. Included in the attorney fees were fees for 
six expenditure categories: (I) attorney fees for a possible complaint against the business's 
accountant and the accountant's firm; (2) fees paid to a law firm for an accountant's review in 
preparation of filing a complaint against the business's accountant and the accountant's firm; 
(3) attorney fees associated with the actual complaint against the business's accountant and the 
accountant's firm; ( 4) attorney foes associated with a complaint against the business's bank; 
(5) attorney fees associated with filing an adversary complaint in Hurles' bankruptcy; and 
(6) attorney fees associated with Hurles' restitution hearing. 
At the first restitution hearing, in response to a question from the district court, the 
testifying owner of the business stated that she incurred attorney fees. The district court then 
stated that it needed to be apprised of the amounts the owners were spending "on attorneys and 
accountants and other people to figure out what's been stolen." Immediately after the district 
court made this statement, Hurles' defense attorney objected, and the district court stated: 
You can object to it. But if you [the testifying owner] would provide that 
information to me at the final restitution hearing, I'd like to know that to know 
what all the victim is out as a result of the theft that occurred to the victim. The 
victim is entitled to be paid for compensation for what they are out as a result of 
the theft. 
Hurles argues that under the analysis of State v, Parker, 143 Idaho 165, 139 PJd 767 (Ct. 
App. 2006), attorney fees for civil cases are noneconomic damages and cannot be awarded via 
restitution. Specifically, Hurles contends the fees associated with a complaint against the 
accountant and the accountant's firm are based on the accountant's breach of duty and are 
against a third party. Hurles notes that the basis for the lawsuit against the bank is unclear and 
that the lawsuit is against a third party. As to the fees related to the bankruptcy, Hurles asserts 
13 
the preparatron of the bankruptcy adversary was a move to prevent future harm and is 
not compensable under Parker. Hurles further argues the amount of the attorney foes associated 
with Hurles' restitution hearing is unreasonable because it represents the amount spent for a 
paralegal to prepare a spreadsheet. 
In Parker, we analyzed whether certain attorney fees were a direct economic loss as a 
result of criminal conduct. Parker was a bookkeeper at a business when she forged ten business 
checks and deposited them into her own account. Parker pled guilty to one count of forgery. A 
provision in the restitution order required Parker to pay attorney fees in the victim's civil case 
against Parker. We looked to prior cases and determined that economic loss awardable as 
restitution included "necessary expenses or losses that the victim incurred in order to address the 
consequences of the criminal conduct." Id. at 167, !39 P.3d at 769. We also noted that an 
expense to prevent future harm was not compensable as restitution, Id. (citing State v. 
Waidelich, 140 Idaho 622, 624, 97 P.3d 489, 491 (Ct. App. 2004)). The principal question in 
assessing the restitution award for attorney fees in Parker was whether the attorney fees for 
filing the civil lawsuit were an expense that was necessary in order for the victim to recover the 
losses caused by Parker's forgeries. Id. at 168, 139 PJd at 770. The victim's civil complaint, 
although including a claim for the amount of forged checks, also included claims for damages for 
overpayment of wages and for conspiracy and unjust enrichment related to two other defendants. 
Id. The lawsuit and attorney fees "were unnecessary to recover the victim's direct loss caused by 
the forgeries, for that loss was entirely compensable through the restitution order in the criminal 
case." Id Tims, we held the attorney fees in the Parker lawsuit were not an economic loss 
under section 19-5304( I )(a). Parker, 143 ldaho at 168, 139 P.3d at 770. 
a, Attorney fees concerning the accountant and the accountant's firm 
and the bank 
Of the six expenditure categories of attorney fees awarded, three concern a legal action 
against the business's accountant and the accountant's firm, and one concerns a legal action 
against the business's bank. As both parties acknowledge, the record contains only a scintilla of 
information concerning the purpose behind the lawsuits. Indeed, the State acknowledges that 
"the record does not include much detail regarding the lawsuits filed by the [owners of the 
business] against their accountant and bank," but the State suggests "the lawsuits were 
undoubtedly filed as the result of Hurles' thefts." Before determining whether the attorney fees 
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were caused by the crime, we must determine if the attorney 
under Parker. 
are a direct economic loss 
For the attorney fees to be considered a direct economic loss, they must be necessary for 
the business to recover the losses caused by Hurles' embezzlement. Parker, 143 1daho at 167, 
139 P.3d at 769. We cannot say that the attorney fees associated with an action against the 
accountant and the accountant's firm are necessary to recover the losses from Hurles' crime. 
Accordingly, the attorney fees for the legal action concerning the accountant and the 
accountant's firm are not awardable as restitution. The same is true with the attorney fees for an 
action against the business's bank, as they are not necessary to recover losses that were 
embezzled by Hurles. 
b, Attorney fees concerning the bankruptcy proceedings 
The business also incurred attorney fees for the preparation and filing of an adversary 
complaint in Hurles' bankruptcy. As the PSI investigator noted, Hurles and her husband filed for 
bankruptcy in December 20 I 0. When a bankruptcy proceeding is pending, "[Federal Rule of 
Bankruptcy Procedure) 700 l sets forth ten matters that must be brought as adversary 
proceedings, including, with exceptions not relevant in this case, a proceeding to recover money 
or property." In re Dean, 359 B.R. 218, 221 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2006). "Adversary proceedings 
have been described as 'full blown federal lawsuits within the larger bankruptcy case."' Id 
(quoting In re Wood and Locker, Inc., 868 F.2d 139, 142 (5th Cir. 1989)). Once Hurles filed for 
bankruptcy, it became necessary for the business to incur attorney fees to prepare and file an 
adversary complaint to recover losses caused by Hurles' embezzlement. Thus, the attorney fees 
related to the bankruptcy adversary complaint are an economic loss under Parker. Contrary to 
Hurles' assertion that the fees are to prevent a future harm and not compensable, the fees are not 
meant to prevent future harm as referenced in fYaidelich, 140 Idaho at 624, 97 P.3d at 491. In 
Waidelich, Waidelich had attempted to break into the victim's home and steal a puppy. The 
owner sought restitution for boarding the puppies "out of concern that Waidelich or his 
accomplices would return to steal the puppies." Id at 623, 97 P.3d at 490. Because the 
puppy-boarding expenses were an attempt to prevent a future harm, we determined they were 
"not a proper item of restitution under Idaho Code§ 19-5304." Id at 624, 97 P.3d at 491. Here, 
the attorney fees for preparation of an adversary complaint in the bankruptcy proceeding were 
necessary in order for the business to protect the l'ight to recover the losses already directly 
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caused by Hurles' embezzlement. Otherwise, business's claim against Hurles might have 
been discharged in bankrnprcy. the district court did not abuse discretion 
awarding attorney fees concerning an adversary complaint made necessary as a result of Hurles' 
bankruptcy. 
c. Attorney Fees Concerning tbe Restitution Hearing 
The business further incurred attorney fees by having a law firm represent it during the 
restitution hearing, including fees associated with the preparation of the embezzlement loss 
spreadsheet prepared and presented by the paralegal. Attorney fees spent determining the 
amount of restitution for the defendant's crime are allowed under Parker, as they are necessary 
to recover the losses related to a defendant's crime. Parker, 143 Idaho at 167, !39 P.3d at 769. 
Here, the award included restitution for the attorney fees incurred in preparing a spreadsheet 
showing embezzlement losses from 2005 through 20 I 0. Ho,vever, the restitution statute limits 
the discretion of the court in awarding restitution to the crime charged. ln this case, that time 
frame is limited to the December 2008 to December 2009 time period, and on remand the 
attorney fees awarded should be adjusted accordingly. Because we reverse the restitution order 
as to the award of attorney fees concerning the restitution hearings and remand the case, we do 
not address Hurles' contention that these fees are unreasonable. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
We reverse the restitution order as to the award of restitution for embezzlement losses 
and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. At the time the 
accountant-client privilege was asserted, the accountant was not asked to disclose information 
protected by the privilege. We further conclude that the district court, on remand, may only 
award restitution for the December 2008 to December 2009 time period. 
We reverse the award of restitution for attorney fees concerning the accountant and the 
accountant's firm and concerning the bank. Attorney fees for a legal action against the 
accountant, the accountant's firm, and the business's bank are not awardable as restitution. 
We reverse the award of restitution for attorney fees concerning the restitution hearing 
and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. The attorney fees concerning 
the restitution hearing were necessary to recover the embezzlement. However, such restitution is 
limited to the December 2008 to December 2009 time period. 
16 
We 
proceeding. The d 
the award of restitution for attorney fees concerning the bankruptcy 
court not abuse its 
an adversary complaint made necessary as a result 
awarding attorney fees 
bankruptcy. 
As such, the restitution order is reversed in part and affirmed in part. We remand the 
case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Judge LANSING and Judge MELANSON CONCUR. 
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